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This research advances decentralized multi-agent learning by establishing finite-time high-probability regret bounds for Nash equilibrium convergence in Markov potential games. The proposed algorithms eliminate prohibitive distribution-mismatch coefficients while handling asynchronous updates and bandit feedback, offering scalable solutions for applications like stochastic job scheduling.
High-Probability Nash Regret for Decentralized Learning in Markov $\alpha$-Potential Games: Episodic and Fully Online Asynchronous Algorithms with Applications to Markov Congestion Games
arXiv:2609.14959v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: We study decentralized learning of Nash equilibria (NE) in infinite-horizon discounted Markov games under bandit feedback, focusing on Markov $\alpha$-potential games. We develop KL-projected natural policy gradient (NPG) algorithms in two settings: an episodic setting with frozen policies during sampling and a fully online setting in which players receive a single realized cost sample per time step and update their policies asynchronously along a continuing trajectory. We establish finite-time high-probability NE regret bounds of order $\widetilde O(T^{-1/4})$ and $\widetilde O(T^{-2/15})$ for the episodic and fully online settings, respectively, up to fixed approximation terms. Crucially, our bounds eliminate the distribution-mismatch coefficient, which can scale prohibitively with the size of the state space, while accommodating potential approximation, estimation-oracle bias, and transition sensitivity. We further identify a state-wise potential structure that yields sharper guarantees with additive dependence on the potential approximation error $\alpha$. We specialize the framework to independent-resource Markov congestion games (IMCGs), establish their approximate-potential and transition-sensitivity properties, and construct decentralized estimation oracles from realized costs. As an application, we introduce strategic online job scheduling on stochastic machines and obtain a scalable decentralized algorithm for learning stable dispatching policies. Overall, our results provide the first finite-time high-probability NE regret guarantees for fully online asynchronous decentralized learning in Markov $\alpha$-potential games, remove distribution-mismatch coefficients from the regret bounds, accommodate fixed estimation-oracle bias, and provide scalable decentralized learning with finite-time guarantees for IMCGs.
Abstract:We study decentralized learning of Nash equilibria (NE) in infinite-horizon discounted Markov games under bandit feedback, focusing on Markov $\alpha$-potential games. We develop KL-projected natural policy gradient (NPG) algorithms in two settings: an episodic setting with frozen policies during sampling and a fully online setting in which players receive a single realized cost sample per time step and update their policies asynchronously along a continuing trajectory. We establish finite-time high-probability NE regret bounds of order $\widetilde O(T^{-1/4})$ and $\widetilde O(T^{-2/15})$ for the episodic and fully online settings, respectively, up to fixed approximation terms. Crucially, our bounds eliminate the distribution-mismatch coefficient, which can scale prohibitively with the size of the state space, while accommodating potential approximation, estimation-oracle bias, and transition sensitivity. We further identify a state-wise potential structure that yields sharper guarantees with additive dependence on the potential approximation error $\alpha$. We specialize the framework to independent-resource Markov congestion games (IMCGs), establish their approximate-potential and transition-sensitivity properties, and construct decentralized estimation oracles from realized costs. As an application, we introduce strategic online job scheduling on stochastic machines and obtain a scalable decentralized algorithm for learning stable dispatching policies. Overall, our results provide the first finite-time high-probability NE regret guarantees for fully online asynchronous decentralized learning in Markov $\alpha$-potential games, remove distribution-mismatch coefficients from the regret bounds, accommodate fixed estimation-oracle bias, and provide scalable decentralized learning with finite-time guarantees for IMCGs.
Machine Learning (cs.LG); Computer Science and Game Theory (cs.GT); Multiagent Systems (cs.MA); Systems and Control (eess.SY); Optimization and Control (math.OC)
arXiv:2609.14959 [cs.LG]
(or arXiv:2609.14959v1 [cs.LG] for this version)
https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2609.14959 arXiv-issued DOI via DataCite (pending registration)
From: S. Rasoul Etesami [view email] [v1] Mon, 14 Sep 2026 03:06:51 UTC (406 KB)
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