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This research identifies a distinct cross-layer signature where harmful intent in LLMs consolidates progressively through transformer depths, unlike benign prompts which remain flat or oscillatory. The authors leverage this "Harmfulness Propagation Dynamics" to introduce \herald{}, an ultra-lightweight input moderator that monitors activation trajectories with negligible inference overhead while significantly improving adversarial jailbreak detection. By providing interpretable audit records of when and how harmfulness emerges, this work offers a robust new approach to model safety without relying on heavy gradient computations.
Harmfulness Propagation Dynamics: Layer-wise Trajectories of Adversarial Intent in Large Language Models
arXiv:2609.13534v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: We identify \textbf{Harmfulness Propagation Dynamics (HPD)}: for harmful prompts, the projection of the last-token hidden state onto a learned harm direction rises monotonically with transformer depth, whereas benign prompts remain flat or oscillatory. This cross-layer signature reflects harmful intent as a \emph{progressively resolved} semantic property: surface form appears early, while pragmatic intent consolidates later, making the \emph{trajectory shape} more informative than any single-layer snapshot. Moreover, LDA-based harm directions, learned per layer, remain stable across random splits (pairwise cosine similarity $>0.97$), supporting the projection sequence as a reproducible structured signal. Building on HPD, we introduce \textbf{\herald{}} (\textbf{H}armful \textbf{E}ncoding \textbf{R}ecognition via \textbf{A}ctivation \textbf{L}ayer \textbf{D}ynamics). This lightweight input moderator extracts a seven-dimensional feature record, slope, curvature, monotonicity, onset layer, and related statistics from the cross-layer projection sequence and classifies it with a 288-parameter MLP. \herald{} stores one $d$-dimensional direction per layer ($262$\,KB for a 32-layer, $d{=}4096$ model), requires no gradient computation during training, and adds only $2.6{\times}10^{-6}$ prefill FLOPs at inference. Across eight prompt-harmfulness benchmarks and four model families, \herald{} achieves an average F1 of $89.3$ on OLMo2-7B, surpassing all tested guard models on adversarial jailbreak detection ($98.4$ vs.\ $96.9$ F1) and outperforming prior latent-based methods by $2.3$-$4.1$ F1 points on every backbone. Per-instance trajectories provide machine-readable audit records that reveal \emph{when} and \emph{how} harmfulness emerges, offering an interpretability advantage over single-layer approaches.
Abstract:We identify \textbf{Harmfulness Propagation Dynamics (HPD)}: for harmful prompts, the projection of the last-token hidden state onto a learned harm direction rises monotonically with transformer depth, whereas benign prompts remain flat or oscillatory. This cross-layer signature reflects harmful intent as a \emph{progressively resolved} semantic property: surface form appears early, while pragmatic intent consolidates later, making the \emph{trajectory shape} more informative than any single-layer snapshot. Moreover, LDA-based harm directions, learned per layer, remain stable across random splits (pairwise cosine similarity $>0.97$), supporting the projection sequence as a reproducible structured signal. Building on HPD, we introduce \textbf{\herald{}} (\textbf{H}armful \textbf{E}ncoding \textbf{R}ecognition via \textbf{A}ctivation \textbf{L}ayer \textbf{D}ynamics). This lightweight input moderator extracts a seven-dimensional feature record, slope, curvature, monotonicity, onset layer, and related statistics from the cross-layer projection sequence and classifies it with a 288-parameter MLP. \herald{} stores one $d$-dimensional direction per layer ($262$\,KB for a 32-layer, $d{=}4096$ model), requires no gradient computation during training, and adds only $2.6{\times}10^{-6}$ prefill FLOPs at inference. Across eight prompt-harmfulness benchmarks and four model families, \herald{} achieves an average F1 of $89.3$ on OLMo2-7B, surpassing all tested guard models on adversarial jailbreak detection ($98.4$ vs.\ $96.9$ F1) and outperforming prior latent-based methods by $2.3$-$4.1$ F1 points on every backbone. Per-instance trajectories provide machine-readable audit records that reveal \emph{when} and \emph{how} harmfulness emerges, offering an interpretability advantage over single-layer approaches.
International Conference on Machine Learning (ICML) Workshop on Mechanistic Interpretability in 2026, accepted in South Korea. this https URL
Computation and Language (cs.CL)
arXiv:2609.13534 [cs.CL]
(or arXiv:2609.13534v1 [cs.CL] for this version)
https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2609.13534 Focus to learn more arXiv-issued DOI via DataCite (pending registration)
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