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This research addresses a critical gap in the security of Rectified Flow models by developing specialized metrics to distinguish genuine memorization from intrinsic image complexity. The study reveals that standard uniform training schedules create peak vulnerability at the integration midpoint, proposing a Symmetric Exponential sampling strategy to mitigate these privacy risks without sacrificing generation quality.
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Generalization and Memorization in Rectified Flow

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arXiv:2603.13421v3 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Generative models based on the Flow Matching objective, particularly Rectified Flow, have emerged as a dominant paradigm for efficient, high-fidelity image synthesis. However, while existing research heavily prioritizes generation quality and architectural scaling, the underlying dynamics of how RF models memorize training data remain largely underexplored. In this paper, we systematically investigate the memorization behaviors of RF through the test statistics of Membership Inference Attacks (MIA). We progressively formulate three test statistics, culminating in a complexity-calibrated metric that successfully decouples intrinsic image spatial complexity from genuine memorization signals. This calibration yields a significant performance surge -- boosting attack AUC by up to 15% and the privacy-critical TPR@1%FPR metric by up to 45% -- establishing the first non-trivial MIA specifically tailored for RF. Leveraging these refined metrics, we uncover a distinct temporal pattern: under standard uniform temporal training, a model's susceptibility to MIA strictly peaks at the integration midpoint, a phenomenon we justify via the network's forced deviation from linear approximations. Finally, we demonstrate that substituting uniform timestep sampling with a Symmetric Exponential (U-shaped) distribution effectively minimizes exposure to vulnerable intermediate timesteps. Extensive evaluations across three datasets confirm that this temporal regularization suppresses memorization while preserving generative fidelity.

Abstract:Generative models based on the Flow Matching objective, particularly Rectified Flow, have emerged as a dominant paradigm for efficient, high-fidelity image synthesis. However, while existing research heavily prioritizes generation quality and architectural scaling, the underlying dynamics of how RF models memorize training data remain largely underexplored. In this paper, we systematically investigate the memorization behaviors of RF through the test statistics of Membership Inference Attacks (MIA). We progressively formulate three test statistics, culminating in a complexity-calibrated metric that successfully decouples intrinsic image spatial complexity from genuine memorization signals. This calibration yields a significant performance surge -- boosting attack AUC by up to 15% and the privacy-critical TPR@1%FPR metric by up to 45% -- establishing the first non-trivial MIA specifically tailored for RF. Leveraging these refined metrics, we uncover a distinct temporal pattern: under standard uniform temporal training, a model's susceptibility to MIA strictly peaks at the integration midpoint, a phenomenon we justify via the network's forced deviation from linear approximations. Finally, we demonstrate that substituting uniform timestep sampling with a Symmetric Exponential (U-shaped) distribution effectively minimizes exposure to vulnerable intermediate timesteps. Extensive evaluations across three datasets confirm that this temporal regularization suppresses memorization while preserving generative fidelity.

Machine Learning (cs.LG); Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition (cs.CV)

arXiv:2603.13421 [cs.LG]

(or arXiv:2603.13421v3 [cs.LG] for this version)

https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2603.13421 Focus to learn more arXiv-issued DOI via DataCite

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