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This paper proposes a structural framework for understanding emotion in large language models by mapping them to Aristotelian dispositions within high-dimensional state spaces, moving beyond the binary debate of behavioral mimicry versus phenomenal consciousness. The authors argue that true affective alignment requires regulatory embodiment, temporal continuity, and an integrated self-model, suggesting current mechanistic interpretability findings fall short of establishing full emotional agency.
Functional Emotion Without Character: Large Language Models, Aristotelian Disposition, and the Limits of Behavioral Alignment
arXiv:2609.22362v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Debates about whether artificial systems can feel are often forced between two unsatisfactory positions: behavioral equivalence is treated as sufficient for emotion, or phenomenal consciousness is treated as a prerequisite that makes the question empirically inaccessible. This article develops a structural alternative. It models emotions as context-sensitive regions, trajectories and attractor dynamics in high-dimensional representational state spaces. Recent mechanistic interpretability findings support the existence of causally active emotion-concept representations in large language models, but they do not establish subjective feeling or full emotional agency. Assessed against published adequacy standards for representation in language models, intervention provides strong evidence of causal use, while full affective role integration, uniformity across subject domains and coherence remain only partially established; there is no direct analogue of accuracy. These mismatches expose the need for a standard of affective appropriateness, which an account of character must supply. Such an account requires three further conditions: regulatory embodiment that gives valence endogenous stakes, temporal continuity that allows affective episodes to accumulate into a history, and an integrated self-model that binds that history to persistent values. Aristotle's concepts of path\=e, hexis, mesot\=es and phron\=esis are translated into a state-space sketch in which practical wisdom includes competence in estimating normatively salient context, not merely acting on a context description already given. The framework reframes alignment as a problem of durable disposition rather than output conformity, and yields interventional tests with explicit control conditions.
Abstract:Debates about whether artificial systems can feel are often forced between two unsatisfactory positions: behavioral equivalence is treated as sufficient for emotion, or phenomenal consciousness is treated as a prerequisite that makes the question empirically inaccessible. This article develops a structural alternative. It models emotions as context-sensitive regions, trajectories and attractor dynamics in high-dimensional representational state spaces. Recent mechanistic interpretability findings support the existence of causally active emotion-concept representations in large language models, but they do not establish subjective feeling or full emotional agency. Assessed against published adequacy standards for representation in language models, intervention provides strong evidence of causal use, while full affective role integration, uniformity across subject domains and coherence remain only partially established; there is no direct analogue of accuracy. These mismatches expose the need for a standard of affective appropriateness, which an account of character must supply. Such an account requires three further conditions: regulatory embodiment that gives valence endogenous stakes, temporal continuity that allows affective episodes to accumulate into a history, and an integrated self-model that binds that history to persistent values. Aristotle's concepts of pathē, hexis, mesotēs and phronēsis are translated into a state-space sketch in which practical wisdom includes competence in estimating normatively salient context, not merely acting on a context description already given. The framework reframes alignment as a problem of durable disposition rather than output conformity, and yields interventional tests with explicit control conditions.
Computation and Language (cs.CL); Computers and Society (cs.CY); Human-Computer Interaction (cs.HC)
arXiv:2609.22362 [cs.CL]
(or arXiv:2609.22362v1 [cs.CL] for this version)
https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2609.22362 Focus to learn more arXiv-issued DOI via DataCite (pending registration)
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