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This paper addresses the critical security gap where autonomous LLM agents could execute unauthorized actions via prompt injection by combining interpretation and signing authority. The proposed KITA architecture enforces a strict separation between content review and authorization, utilizing threshold BLS signatures to ensure that valid actions require contributions from multiple uncompromised domains. This research advances AI safety by establishing execution-bound integrity for high-stakes agent workflows involving payments or permission changes.
From Review to Authorization: Key-Isolated Threshold Signing for LLM Agents
arXiv:2609.05901v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Autonomous LLM agents can turn untrusted content into effectful actions such as payments and permission changes. If the same process interprets this content and controls a reusable signing credential, prompt injection can cross the judgment boundary and reach execution authority. We present KITA, a review-to-authorization architecture that keeps the user's personal secret signing key and every threshold signing-key share outside all LLM processes. Under threshold signature unforgeability and our system assumptions, compromising the proposer and fewer than t reviewer-signer domains cannot produce a valid authorization for a new action without signing contributions from t distinct domains. Thus, any such authorization includes a share from an uncompromised domain, bound to the canonical action and released only after authenticated reviewer approval. This establishes execution-bound authorization integrity. We implement the complete reviewer-to-executor path with a structured-output LLM adapter and threshold BLS. Six system tests validate quorum gating and message binding at this interface, while cryptographic microbenchmarks measure the online signing path and its scaling behavior.
Abstract:Autonomous LLM agents can turn untrusted content into effectful actions such as payments and permission changes. If the same process interprets this content and controls a reusable signing credential, prompt injection can cross the judgment boundary and reach execution authority. We present KITA, a review-to-authorization architecture that keeps the user's personal secret signing key and every threshold signing-key share outside all LLM processes. Under threshold signature unforgeability and our system assumptions, compromising the proposer and fewer than t reviewer-signer domains cannot produce a valid authorization for a new action without signing contributions from t distinct domains. Thus, any such authorization includes a share from an uncompromised domain, bound to the canonical action and released only after authenticated reviewer approval. This establishes execution-bound authorization integrity. We implement the complete reviewer-to-executor path with a structured-output LLM adapter and threshold BLS. Six system tests validate quorum gating and message binding at this interface, while cryptographic microbenchmarks measure the online signing path and its scaling behavior.
Cryptography and Security (cs.CR); Artificial Intelligence (cs.AI)
arXiv:2609.05901 [cs.CR]
(or arXiv:2609.05901v1 [cs.CR] for this version)
https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2609.05901 Focus to learn more arXiv-issued DOI via DataCite (pending registration)
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