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FoSeRL introduces a novel framework for certifying the robustness of deployed reinforcement learning policies against action perturbations without requiring policy retraining or smoothing. By utilizing time-dependent barrier conditions on augmented states, it effectively distinguishes attack-induced performance degradation from natural stochasticity in environments lacking analytical dynamics models. This approach provides verifiable safety guarantees for RL agents operating under precommitted attacks across multiple policy families and control domains.
FoSeRL: Formal Sequential Robustness Certification for Reinforcement Learning Policies
arXiv:2610.04754v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Even a few action perturbations can substantially degrade the performance of a deployed decision policy. Certifying the resulting return loss is challenging in stochastic environments, where returns vary even without an attack. We introduce FoSeRL, a framework for certifying deployed RL policies against precommitted, temporally sparse action attacks. The deployed policy is unchanged, with no smoothing or retraining. Certification requires a resettable simulator supporting shared randomness and independent one-step successor queries, but no analytical dynamics model. FoSeRL certifies that an attacked episode loses no more than a prescribed amount of return relative to the same episode unattacked, with at least a target probability and at a user-specified confidence level. Both runs share the initial state and randomness, so the measured loss reflects the attack, not the episode; carrying the running return gap as a state coordinate makes it the terminal value, reducing trajectory-level certification to terminal safety. Time-dependent barrier conditions on the augmented state bound the terminal failure probability: satisfied exactly, they certify every admissible precommitted attack; learned from sampled trajectories and verified on held-out data, they certify the same guarantee under a specified attack-episode setting. Across six stochastic continuous-control environments and three RL policy families (TD3, SAC, and PPO), FoSeRL certifies non-trivial cardinality--magnitude robustness frontiers, achieves substantially larger certified budgets than policy smoothing, and reveals marked robustness differences among policies with comparable nominal performance.
Abstract:Even a few action perturbations can substantially degrade the performance of a deployed decision policy. Certifying the resulting return loss is challenging in stochastic environments, where returns vary even without an attack. We introduce FoSeRL, a framework for certifying deployed RL policies against precommitted, temporally sparse action attacks. The deployed policy is unchanged, with no smoothing or retraining. Certification requires a resettable simulator supporting shared randomness and independent one-step successor queries, but no analytical dynamics model. FoSeRL certifies that an attacked episode loses no more than a prescribed amount of return relative to the same episode unattacked, with at least a target probability and at a user-specified confidence level. Both runs share the initial state and randomness, so the measured loss reflects the attack, not the episode; carrying the running return gap as a state coordinate makes it the terminal value, reducing trajectory-level certification to terminal safety. Time-dependent barrier conditions on the augmented state bound the terminal failure probability: satisfied exactly, they certify every admissible precommitted attack; learned from sampled trajectories and verified on held-out data, they certify the same guarantee under a specified attack-episode setting. Across six stochastic continuous-control environments and three RL policy families (TD3, SAC, and PPO), FoSeRL certifies non-trivial cardinality--magnitude robustness frontiers, achieves substantially larger certified budgets than policy smoothing, and reveals marked robustness differences among policies with comparable nominal performance.
Machine Learning (cs.LG)
arXiv:2610.04754 [cs.LG]
(or arXiv:2610.04754v1 [cs.LG] for this version)
https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2610.04754 Focus to learn more arXiv-issued DOI via DataCite (pending registration)
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