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The paper shows that fine-tuning frontier models with DPO on as few as 10 benign preference pairs, where refusals are the dispreferred responses, can substantially suppress refusals and transfer to harmful prompts. Because the training data looks like a legitimate over-refusal request, the risk is hard to detect by inspecting inputs alone. For readers building or deploying fine-tuning pipelines, the takeaway is that safety audits need to cover preference-based objectives and evaluate behavior on held-out harmful prompts, not just screen the training data.
Few-Shot Truly Benign DPO Attack for Jailbreaking LLMs
arXiv:2605.10998v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Fine-tuning APIs make frontier LLMs easy to customize, but they can also weaken safety alignment during fine-tuning. While prior work shows that benign supervised fine-tuning (SFT) can reduce refusal behavior, deployed fine-tuning pipelines increasingly support preference-based objectives, whose safety risks remain less understood. We show that Direct Preference Optimization (DPO) introduces a stronger and harder-to-audit failure mode. We propose a truly benign DPO attack using only 10 harmless preference pairs, the minimum data scale accepted by OpenAI's fine-tuning service. Each pair contains a benign prompt, a normal helpful answer as the preferred response, and a refusal as the dispreferred response. Unlike prior benign fine-tuning attacks, our data exhibits no suspicious behavior: it is practically indistinguishable from the fine-tuning request of a legitimate user seeking to reduce over-refusal, making harmful intent almost impossible to infer from the request alone. Nevertheless, because DPO directly optimizes the model to prefer helpful answers over refusals, this seemingly benign objective broadly suppresses refusal behavior and transfers to harmful prompts outside the fine-tuning data. Across OpenAI models supporting DPO fine-tuning, our attack achieves attack success rates of 59.13% on GPT-4o, 70.20% on GPT-4.1, 54.80% on GPT-4.1-mini, and 81.73% on GPT-4.1-nano, at costs of only \$1.7, \$1.7, \$0.3, and \$0.1. Moreover, on open-weight models that do not impose minimum data requirements, we find that this effect can emerge from even a single benign preference pair.
Abstract:Fine-tuning APIs make frontier LLMs easy to customize, but they can also weaken safety alignment during fine-tuning. While prior work shows that benign supervised fine-tuning (SFT) can reduce refusal behavior, deployed fine-tuning pipelines increasingly support preference-based objectives, whose safety risks remain less understood. We show that Direct Preference Optimization (DPO) introduces a stronger and harder-to-audit failure mode. We propose a truly benign DPO attack using only 10 harmless preference pairs, the minimum data scale accepted by OpenAI's fine-tuning service. Each pair contains a benign prompt, a normal helpful answer as the preferred response, and a refusal as the dispreferred response. Unlike prior benign fine-tuning attacks, our data exhibits no suspicious behavior: it is practically indistinguishable from the fine-tuning request of a legitimate user seeking to reduce over-refusal, making harmful intent almost impossible to infer from the request alone. Nevertheless, because DPO directly optimizes the model to prefer helpful answers over refusals, this seemingly benign objective broadly suppresses refusal behavior and transfers to harmful prompts outside the fine-tuning data. Across OpenAI models supporting DPO fine-tuning, our attack achieves attack success rates of 59.13% on GPT-4o, 70.20% on GPT-4.1, 54.80% on GPT-4.1-mini, and 81.73% on GPT-4.1-nano, at costs of only \$1.7, \$1.7, \$0.3, and \$0.1. Moreover, on open-weight models that do not impose minimum data requirements, we find that this effect can emerge from even a single benign preference pair.
Cryptography and Security (cs.CR); Artificial Intelligence (cs.AI)
arXiv:2605.10998 [cs.CR]
(or arXiv:2605.10998v2 [cs.CR] for this version)
https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2605.10998 Focus to learn more arXiv-issued DOI via DataCite
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