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This research establishes the security of a practical BB84 quantum key distribution implementation by rigorously accounting for imperfections and uncertainty margins in real-world single-photon sources and detectors. By proving that competitive performance is achievable even with incompletely characterized devices, this work bridges the gap between theoretical QKD proofs and deployable, loophole-free cryptographic systems.
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Experimental quantum cryptography with single photons and imperfect devices

arXiv2 min de cititArticolul și perspectiva sunt în engleză.

arXiv:2607.19204v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Quantum key distribution (QKD) allows for provably secure key distribution between two trusted parties. Because the security and performance of QKD protocols rely on devices that behave according to specific assumptions, idealized or inaccurate assumptions about device behavior can introduce security loopholes. Real devices can never be perfectly characterized, and their performance metrics are always subject to certain error margins, which must be accounted for in a rigorous theoretical analysis. Only recently have rigorous finite-size results allowed for imperfect characterizations of devices (where device parameter have uncertainty margins) - an advance yet to be considered in experimental implementations of the BB84 protocol. In this work, we prove the security and analyze the performance of an implementation of the BB84 protocol using single photons generated by a semiconductor quantum dot light source in combination with dynamic polarization-state encoding. We consider the presence of incompletely characterized devices by accounting for imperfections in the single-photon source (in terms of finite g(2)(0)) as well as the receiver (non-ideal beam-splitters, finite detector efficiencies, and dark counts), all with error margins. The resulting protocol implementation shows competitive performance, paving the way towards practical and loop-hole free implementations of QKD.

Abstract:Quantum key distribution (QKD) allows for provably secure key distribution between two trusted parties. Because the security and performance of QKD protocols rely on devices that behave according to specific assumptions, idealized or inaccurate assumptions about device behavior can introduce security loopholes. Real devices can never be perfectly characterized, and their performance metrics are always subject to certain error margins, which must be accounted for in a rigorous theoretical analysis. Only recently have rigorous finite-size results allowed for imperfect characterizations of devices (where device parameter have uncertainty margins) - an advance yet to be considered in experimental implementations of the BB84 protocol. In this work, we prove the security and analyze the performance of an implementation of the BB84 protocol using single photons generated by a semiconductor quantum dot light source in combination with dynamic polarization-state encoding. We consider the presence of incompletely characterized devices by accounting for imperfections in the single-photon source (in terms of finite g(2)(0)) as well as the receiver (non-ideal beam-splitters, finite detector efficiencies, and dark counts), all with error margins. The resulting protocol implementation shows competitive performance, paving the way towards practical and loop-hole free implementations of QKD.

arXiv:2607.19204 [quant-ph]

(or arXiv:2607.19204v1 [quant-ph] for this version)

https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2607.19204 arXiv-issued DOI via DataCite (pending registration)

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