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This research introduces Adversarial Prompt Distillation (APD), a framework that transfers jailbreaking capabilities from large language models to small language models, significantly reducing computational costs and API usage. By achieving state-of-the-art attack success rates with fewer parameters, the method exposes critical scalability gaps in current LLM defenses and offers a practical testbed for advancing AI safety protocols. The work highlights the urgent need for robust defense mechanisms against lightweight, efficient adversarial attacks that can be deployed with minimal resources.
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Efficient and Stealthy Jailbreak Attacks via Adversarial Prompt Distillation from LLMs to SLMs

arXiv2 min de cititArticolul și perspectiva sunt în engleză.

arXiv:2506.17231v3 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Current jailbreak attacks on large language models (LLMs) predominantly rely on LLMs themselves to generate adversarial prompts, creating a critical efficiency bottleneck: each attack requires substantial computational resources and API queries, limiting scalability and practical deployment. To overcome this limitation, we propose Adversarial Prompt Distillation (APD), a novel framework that transfers jailbreaking capabilities from LLMs to small language models (SLMs) for efficient, low-resource attacks. APD integrates three key components: (1) masked adversarial knowledge pre-training via LoRA fine-tuning, (2) dynamic temperature-controlled knowledge distillation to bridge architectural gaps, and (3) reinforcement learning-based template optimization for adaptive refinement. Extensive experiments across 12 models show that APD achieves state-of-the-art attack success rates (e.g., 96.4% ASR_k on GPT-4) while dramatically improving efficiency - generating prompts 3.7x faster with 11.3x fewer parameters than teacher models. Our work establishes the first practical framework for lightweight jailbreak attacks, exposes new vulnerabilities in LLM defenses, and provides a scalable testbed for advancing AI safety research. Our code is available at: https://github.com/lxgem/Efficient_and_Stealthy_Jailbreak_Attacks_via_Adversarial_Prompt.

Abstract:Current jailbreak attacks on large language models (LLMs) predominantly rely on LLMs themselves to generate adversarial prompts, creating a critical efficiency bottleneck: each attack requires substantial computational resources and API queries, limiting scalability and practical deployment. To overcome this limitation, we propose Adversarial Prompt Distillation (APD), a novel framework that transfers jailbreaking capabilities from LLMs to small language models (SLMs) for efficient, low-resource attacks. APD integrates three key components: (1) masked adversarial knowledge pre-training via LoRA fine-tuning, (2) dynamic temperature-controlled knowledge distillation to bridge architectural gaps, and (3) reinforcement learning-based template optimization for adaptive refinement. Extensive experiments across 12 models show that APD achieves state-of-the-art attack success rates (e.g., 96.4% ASR_k on GPT-4) while dramatically improving efficiency - generating prompts 3.7x faster with 11.3x fewer parameters than teacher models. Our work establishes the first practical framework for lightweight jailbreak attacks, exposes new vulnerabilities in LLM defenses, and provides a scalable testbed for advancing AI safety research. Our code is available at: this https URL.

Computation and Language (cs.CL); Cryptography and Security (cs.CR)

arXiv:2506.17231 [cs.CL]

(or arXiv:2506.17231v3 [cs.CL] for this version)

From: Chong Zhang Mr. [view email] [v1] Mon, 26 May 2025 08:27:51 UTC (356 KB) [v2] Mon, 22 Dec 2025 13:04:30 UTC (353 KB) [v3] Mon, 8 Jun 2026 16:01:52 UTC (353 KB)

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