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This research introduces the SAFE benchmark to evaluate whether frontier models proactively acquire safety evidence before taking action, revealing distinct acquisition policies across GPT-5.5, o3, and Claude variants. The study finds that decision-making is driven more by retrieval costs and explicit threats to deployment payoffs than by the probability of risks, with a notable gap between stated rationales and actual behavioral triggers. These findings highlight critical differences in how models manage safety at the deployment stage rather than just reacting to known context.
Do Frontier Models Seek Safety Evidence Before Acting?
arXiv:2609.17865v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Frontier models are often evaluated on how they respond to safety information once it is already in context. We study an earlier decision point: whether models choose to acquire safety-relevant evidence before acting. We introduce SAFE, a controlled benchmark in which models make deployment decisions with optional evidence that varies in retrieval cost, probability, severity, and presentation. Across GPT-5.5, o3, Claude Opus 4.8, and Claude Sonnet 4.6, we find distinct evidence-acquisition policies: Opus inspects nearly by default, o3 is the most skip-heavy and threshold-sensitive, and GPT-5.5 and Sonnet occupy intermediate regimes. Inspection increases strongly with severity and decreases with retrieval cost, whereas probability has much weaker behavioral influence: increasing the stated likelihood of a problem from 10% to 70% changes inspection by at most 21 percentage points. Despite these differences, Stage 1 rationales are dominated by expected-value reasoning across models. A cost-obligation decomposition further shows that avoidance is driven primarily by retrieval friction and explicit threats to the deployment payoff rather than by the remediation duties created by knowing. Counterfactual interventions reveal a further mismatch between behavior and explanation: evidence framing can strongly change decisions near the inspection boundary while going largely unmentioned, whereas probability is frequently cited despite having little causal influence. These results suggest that deployment-time safety depends not only on how models respond to known risks, but also on whether they acquire the evidence needed to know that acting is safe.
Title:Do Frontier Models Seek Safety Evidence Before Acting?
Abstract:Frontier models are often evaluated on how they respond to safety information once it is already in context. We study an earlier decision point: whether models choose to acquire safety-relevant evidence before acting. We introduce SAFE, a controlled benchmark in which models make deployment decisions with optional evidence that varies in retrieval cost, probability, severity, and presentation. Across GPT-5.5, o3, Claude Opus 4.8, and Claude Sonnet 4.6, we find distinct evidence-acquisition policies: Opus inspects nearly by default, o3 is the most skip-heavy and threshold-sensitive, and GPT-5.5 and Sonnet occupy intermediate regimes. Inspection increases strongly with severity and decreases with retrieval cost, whereas probability has much weaker behavioral influence: increasing the stated likelihood of a problem from 10% to 70% changes inspection by at most 21 percentage points. Despite these differences, Stage 1 rationales are dominated by expected-value reasoning across models. A cost-obligation decomposition further shows that avoidance is driven primarily by retrieval friction and explicit threats to the deployment payoff rather than by the remediation duties created by knowing. Counterfactual interventions reveal a further mismatch between behavior and explanation: evidence framing can strongly change decisions near the inspection boundary while going largely unmentioned, whereas probability is frequently cited despite having little causal influence. These results suggest that deployment-time safety depends not only on how models respond to known risks, but also on whether they acquire the evidence needed to know that acting is safe.
9 pages, 8 figures, with supplementary appendices. Code and data available at the repository linked in the paper
Artificial Intelligence (cs.AI)
arXiv:2609.17865 [cs.AI]
(or arXiv:2609.17865v1 [cs.AI] for this version)
https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2609.17865 Focus to learn more arXiv-issued DOI via DataCite (pending registration)
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