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This paper addresses a critical gap in verifying AI agents by demonstrating how standard test suites often miss deep internal state corruptions due to poor input coverage. By applying mutation analysis and enumerating discriminating dimensions, the authors show that adding specific fixtures can expose hidden failures invisible to traditional pass/fail metrics. This work is essential for building robust agent infrastructure where verification reliability directly impacts deployment safety.
Discriminating Fixture Coverage in Agent-Infrastructure Verification Suites
arXiv:2610.02928v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Invariant suites and runtime monitors increasingly gate agent deployment decisions, and the evidence offered for any particular suite is almost always a single observation: it passes an implementation believed correct and fails one believed broken. We measure what that observation is worth. Applying mutation analysis to an invariant suite for a multi-session agent state-projection layer, we first find that this standard validation certifies a suite in which a first-order mutant removing event-identity deduplication survives every check. We then freeze the repaired twelve-check suite, record its hash, and run it once against ten mutants specified by an adversarial reader who designed none of its fixtures: it kills five. Instrumenting the five survivors against the reference shows they fail in two distinct ways, not one. Three are never activated, because no fixture supplies an input on which the mutated code behaves differently at all. The other two corrupt internal state that no oracle in the suite can observe. The two modes need different repairs, and neither is visible from a pass/fail report. Treating the missing inputs as a coverage question, we enumerate seven discriminating dimensions of the input space, register in advance which are uncovered and which survivors they should explain, and add one fixture per uncovered dimension while reusing the existing oracles verbatim. All five survivors then die, each to the check written for its predicted dimension. We report this as a repair result on the same challenge set rather than a second held-out estimate, and give the artifact, including the frozen hash, the registered predictions, all mutants and the run logs, so the distinction is checkable.
Abstract:Invariant suites and runtime monitors increasingly gate agent deployment decisions, and the evidence offered for any particular suite is almost always a single observation: it passes an implementation believed correct and fails one believed broken. We measure what that observation is worth. Applying mutation analysis to an invariant suite for a multi-session agent state-projection layer, we first find that this standard validation certifies a suite in which a first-order mutant removing event-identity deduplication survives every check. We then freeze the repaired twelve-check suite, record its hash, and run it once against ten mutants specified by an adversarial reader who designed none of its fixtures: it kills five. Instrumenting the five survivors against the reference shows they fail in two distinct ways, not one. Three are never activated, because no fixture supplies an input on which the mutated code behaves differently at all. The other two corrupt internal state that no oracle in the suite can observe. The two modes need different repairs, and neither is visible from a pass/fail report. Treating the missing inputs as a coverage question, we enumerate seven discriminating dimensions of the input space, register in advance which are uncovered and which survivors they should explain, and add one fixture per uncovered dimension while reusing the existing oracles verbatim. All five survivors then die, each to the check written for its predicted dimension. We report this as a repair result on the same challenge set rather than a second held-out estimate, and give the artifact, including the frozen hash, the registered predictions, all mutants and the run logs, so the distinction is checkable.
10 pages, 1 figure, 2 tables. NeurIPS 2026 Workshop: Who Verifies the Agents? Toward Reliable Agent Development
Software Engineering (cs.SE); Artificial Intelligence (cs.AI); Machine Learning (cs.LG)
arXiv:2610.02928 [cs.SE]
(or arXiv:2610.02928v1 [cs.SE] for this version)
https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2610.02928 Focus to learn more arXiv-issued DOI via DataCite (pending registration)
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