Diagnosing the Explicit-to-Applied Theory of Mind Gap in LLMs

arXiv:2610.31060v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: As large language models are deployed in high-stakes roles such as therapy, education, and personal assistance, their social cognition must be assessed reliably. Current Theory of Mind (ToM) benchmarks report aggregate scores that conflate two distinct competencies: explicit ToM (recognizing what someone believes) and applied ToM (using that belief to predict behavior). Building on this distinction, we investigate the gap and its recoverability using four structurally diverse benchmarks. Aggregate reporting obscures uneven competence: on SimpleToM, Llama-3.1-8B scores 51.5 percent overall while recognizing mental states at 99.4 percent and predicting behavior at only 28.9 percent. To assess recovery, we compare structured prompting, matched in-context learning, and our proposed Belief-State Test-Time Training (BSTTT), which adapts lightweight parameters on answered support questions through action reconstruction. Across Qwen2.5-7B, Llama-3.1-8B, and GPT-oss-20B, recovery depends on the model, task, and intervention. On SimpleToM, reminders combined with BSTTT improve Llama's behavior prediction by 40.8 percentage points; reminders account for most of the overall improvement, with BSTTT adding 1.3 to 5.5 points beyond reminders across models. Contextual examples often outperform weight updates, while BSTTT remains stronger in specific model-benchmark settings. Temporal belief tracking remains difficult despite partial recovery. These findings show that aggregate ToM scores can overstate applied competence while hiding performance recoverable through targeted assistance. We recommend decomposed reporting of explicit and applied accuracy alongside intervention comparisons that establish which failures are recoverable and under what conditions.