analiza aiqbench
This research introduces Reciprocal Q-Augmentation (RQA), a reinforcement learning method that enables multi-agent cooperation in general-sum games without requiring access to other agents' rewards or internal states. By leveraging a latent-variable opponent model, RQA allows agents to learn cooperative policies independently while outperforming standard fully cooperative algorithms in social dilemmas like the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma. The approach demonstrates that high social welfare can be achieved even when agents are capable of deception, provided they utilize this specific augmentation technique.
Cooperation Without Shared Rewards via Reciprocal Q-Augmentation
arXiv:2610.24793v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: General-sum games are more challenging than fully cooperative or adversarial settings because agents may deceive or exploit one another. Achieving high social welfare requires sustained cooperation, while a single defection can drive agents toward a welfare suboptimal Nash equilibrium. Moreover, assuming access to other agents' rewards or internal states is often unrealistic and implicitly introduces additional cooperation into the setting. To address this issue, we introduce \textit{Reciprocal Q-Augmentation} (RQA), a method that uses a latent-variable opponent model to augment the Q-function with estimates of how one's actions affects other agents. RQA allows agents to learn both cooperative and defective policies using only their own Q-function. We show that, in social dilemmas, agents that all follow the cooperative policy of RQA learn to cooperate faster and reach higher levels of cooperation than fully cooperative algorithms. Moreover, a single RQA agent that switches appropriately between its cooperative and defecting policies can induce cooperation in agents trained with standard RL algorithms, which would otherwise end up defecting. We evaluate our approach on the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma, Iterated Traveler's Dilemma, Iterated Stag Hunt, and \texttt{CleanUp-Lite}. Our experiments show that the algorithms implementing RQA outperforms fully cooperative methods with shared rewards and enables cooperation with algorithms that otherwise fail to reach high social welfare.
Abstract:General-sum games are more challenging than fully cooperative or adversarial settings because agents may deceive or exploit one another. Achieving high social welfare requires sustained cooperation, while a single defection can drive agents toward a welfare suboptimal Nash equilibrium. Moreover, assuming access to other agents' rewards or internal states is often unrealistic and implicitly introduces additional cooperation into the setting. To address this issue, we introduce \textit{Reciprocal Q-Augmentation} (RQA), a method that uses a latent-variable opponent model to augment the Q-function with estimates of how one's actions affects other agents. RQA allows agents to learn both cooperative and defective policies using only their own Q-function. We show that, in social dilemmas, agents that all follow the cooperative policy of RQA learn to cooperate faster and reach higher levels of cooperation than fully cooperative algorithms. Moreover, a single RQA agent that switches appropriately between its cooperative and defecting policies can induce cooperation in agents trained with standard RL algorithms, which would otherwise end up defecting. We evaluate our approach on the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma, Iterated Traveler's Dilemma, Iterated Stag Hunt, and \texttt{CleanUp-Lite}. Our experiments show that the algorithms implementing RQA outperforms fully cooperative methods with shared rewards and enables cooperation with algorithms that otherwise fail to reach high social welfare.
Computer Science and Game Theory (cs.GT); Artificial Intelligence (cs.AI); Multiagent Systems (cs.MA)
arXiv:2610.24793 [cs.GT]
(or arXiv:2610.24793v1 [cs.GT] for this version)
https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2610.24793 Focus to learn more arXiv-issued DOI via DataCite
arXivLabs is a framework that allows collaborators to develop and share new arXiv features directly on our website.
Both individuals and organizations that work with arXivLabs have embraced and accepted our values of openness, community, excellence, and user data privacy. arXiv is committed to these values and only works with partners that adhere to them.
Have an idea for a project that will add value for arXiv's community? Learn more about arXivLabs.
Text integral sub licența deschisă a publicației · 310 cuvinte