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This article addresses a critical engineering dilemma in post-quantum cryptography: whether to implement hybrid schemes that run new algorithms alongside classical ones or migrate directly to quantum-resistant standards. While national agencies like France mandate hybrid approaches for security, the NSA advises against them to avoid redundant costs once a functional quantum computer emerges. The core takeaway is that the algorithm selection itself is largely settled by standards bodies, but the decision on parameter sets and migration strategy will significantly impact long-term budgeting and system architecture.
Choosing Post-Quantum Algorithms, And Whether To Run Them Alongside The Old Ones

Which post-quantum algorithms to pick, which parameter sets, and the one decision the national agencies still disagree about: whether to run a new algorithm alongside a classical one, or replace it outright.
The algorithm standards are finished, so the hard part of the post-quantum migration is no longer which mathematics to trust. It is two engineering choices the standards deliberately leave open, and on one of them the national cryptographic authorities contradict each other. France has made running a post-quantum algorithm alongside a classical one obligatory inside its regulated scope. The NSA tells American national security systems to avoid doing it. Which post-quantum algorithms to pick is close to decided, and the NCSC will name them for you. Whether to run the new one beside the one it replaces is not decided at all. That is the choice that determines whether you budget for this migration once or twice. Key takeaways Two post-quantum algorithms cover general purpose work. ML-KEM agrees a shared secret, ML-DSA signs, and the NCSC recommends the ML-KEM-768 and ML-DSA-65 parameter sets for most cases. Every parameter set is strong enough up to OFFICIAL. Below that ceiling the choice is about power, bandwidth and size. Above it the NSA requires the largest sets on national security systems. Firmware signing is a different problem. Hash-based signatures rest on other assumptions and suit signatures that must be verified years later. LMS…
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