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This paper challenges the assumption that full autonomy is the inevitable goal of generative AI in software engineering, proposing instead a framework where independence is measured between specific lifecycle roles sharing a common model substrate. It argues that correlated errors from shared training data and toolchains necessitate heterogeneous models, deterministic analyzers, or formal verification to restore statistical independence for critical fault classes. Ultimately, the work redefines human oversight not as blanket supervision but as retaining authority over specifications, accountability, and last-resort halting capabilities within a structured autonomy hierarchy.
Builder, Defender, Breaker: Measurable Independence and Bounded Autonomy When Generative Models Build, Defend and Test Software
arXiv:2607.03215v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Generative models now write application code, harden and monitor it, and probe it for exploitable flaws, so that one family of models increasingly plays builder, defender and breaker at once. The prevailing view treats full autonomy as the natural end point of assistance. This article argues for a narrower and more defensible position than a blanket requirement for human oversight. We define the shared generative substrate as the set of upstream dependencies (training corpus, model family, alignment procedure, vendor, toolchain) that induce correlated errors, and we define independence as a measurable property of pairs of lifecycle roles rather than an attribute of any participant. A coincident-failure model in the tradition of Eckhardt and Lee shows why organisational independence, the proxy on which verification standards have relied, no longer implies statistical independence once roles share a substrate; it also shows that heterogeneous models, deterministic analysers and formal verification can restore independence for the fault classes they cover. What remains for humans is specific: authority over the specification against which every machine oracle is judged, accountability that current governance instruments do not permit to be delegated, and last-resort authority to halt. We translate this into an operational framework with five autonomy levels, three distinct human roles and five decision criteria (consequence, reversibility, time-criticality, verifiability and adversarial exposure), apply it to build, defend and test actions, and specify how independence and oversight effectiveness can be measured. The central claims are stated as testable hypotheses with a protocol for refuting them.
Abstract:Generative models now write application code, harden and monitor it, and probe it for exploitable flaws, so that one family of models increasingly plays builder, defender and breaker at once. The prevailing view treats full autonomy as the natural end point of assistance. This article argues for a narrower and more defensible position than a blanket requirement for human oversight. We define the shared generative substrate as the set of upstream dependencies (training corpus, model family, alignment procedure, vendor, toolchain) that induce correlated errors, and we define independence as a measurable property of pairs of lifecycle roles rather than an attribute of any participant. A coincident-failure model in the tradition of Eckhardt and Lee shows why organisational independence, the proxy on which verification standards have relied, no longer implies statistical independence once roles share a substrate; it also shows that heterogeneous models, deterministic analysers and formal verification can restore independence for the fault classes they cover. What remains for humans is specific: authority over the specification against which every machine oracle is judged, accountability that current governance instruments do not permit to be delegated, and last-resort authority to halt. We translate this into an operational framework with five autonomy levels, three distinct human roles and five decision criteria (consequence, reversibility, time-criticality, verifiability and adversarial exposure), apply it to build, defend and test actions, and specify how independence and oversight effectiveness can be measured. The central claims are stated as testable hypotheses with a protocol for refuting them.
Cryptography and Security (cs.CR); Artificial Intelligence (cs.AI); Software Engineering (cs.SE)
arXiv:2607.03215 [cs.CR]
(or arXiv:2607.03215v2 [cs.CR] for this version)
https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2607.03215 Focus to learn more arXiv-issued DOI via DataCite
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