Sari la conținut

Română · beta. Traducerea a fost făcută automat și este încă în curs de revizuire. Citește pagina în engleză

perspectiva aiqbenchSiguranță AI

analiza aiqbench

This research introduces Anderson-Darling Leakage Assessment (ADLA) as a distribution-sensitive alternative to the widely used Test Vector Leakage Assessment (TVLA), which often misses side-channel vulnerabilities by focusing solely on mean differences. By applying ADLA to shuffling-protected embedded multilayer perceptrons, the study demonstrates that this method uncovers exploitable leakage locations and weight recovery points hidden from conventional analysis. The findings highlight a critical gap in current hardware security practices for deploying AI models, suggesting that distribution-aware testing is essential for robust side-channel protection.
Sursă care acoperăarXiv
Ce este aceastaLectura unui model asupra articolului și a acoperirii conexe, scrisă pentru aiqbench. Nu sunt cuvintele publicației.

Beyond TVLA: Anderson-Darling Leakage Assessment for Neural Network Side-Channel Leakage Detection

arXiv3 min de cititArticolul și perspectiva sunt în engleză.

arXiv:2603.18647v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Test Vector Leakage Assessment (TVLA) is widely used for side-channel leakage detection, but its reliance on Welch's t-test makes it primarily sensitive to differences in the means of two leakage populations. Consequently, TVLA may fail to detect leakage that manifests through changes in other characteristics of the underlying distributions. We introduce Anderson-Darling Leakage Assessment (ADLA), a distribution-sensitive leakage assessment methodology based on the two-sample Anderson-Darling test. To facilitate direct comparison with conventional TVLA, we derive an ADLA decision threshold corresponding to the nominal significance level associated with the standard TVLA threshold of 4.5. We evaluate ADLA on a shuffling-protected embedded multilayer perceptron implementation under both fixed-versus-fixed and fixed-versus-random input configurations. Across the evaluated settings, ADLA produces clearer threshold exceedances than TVLA and reveals leakage locations that are not detected by the mean-based test. To assess the practical relevance of these additional leakage locations, we perform correlation power analysis using points of interest selected from the ADLA and TVLA statistics. The points identified by ADLA enable recovery of the exponent byte of the targeted model weight despite the presence of shuffling. These results demonstrate that distribution-sensitive testing can complement conventional TVLA by revealing exploitable side-channel leakage that may remain hidden from mean-based analysis.

Abstract:Test Vector Leakage Assessment (TVLA) is widely used for side-channel leakage detection, but its reliance on Welch's t-test makes it primarily sensitive to differences in the means of two leakage populations. Consequently, TVLA may fail to detect leakage that manifests through changes in other characteristics of the underlying distributions. We introduce Anderson-Darling Leakage Assessment (ADLA), a distribution-sensitive leakage assessment methodology based on the two-sample Anderson-Darling test. To facilitate direct comparison with conventional TVLA, we derive an ADLA decision threshold corresponding to the nominal significance level associated with the standard TVLA threshold of 4.5. We evaluate ADLA on a shuffling-protected embedded multilayer perceptron implementation under both fixed-versus-fixed and fixed-versus-random input configurations. Across the evaluated settings, ADLA produces clearer threshold exceedances than TVLA and reveals leakage locations that are not detected by the mean-based test. To assess the practical relevance of these additional leakage locations, we perform correlation power analysis using points of interest selected from the ADLA and TVLA statistics. The points identified by ADLA enable recovery of the exponent byte of the targeted model weight despite the presence of shuffling. These results demonstrate that distribution-sensitive testing can complement conventional TVLA by revealing exploitable side-channel leakage that may remain hidden from mean-based analysis.

Cryptography and Security (cs.CR); Artificial Intelligence (cs.AI)

arXiv:2603.18647 [cs.CR]

(or arXiv:2603.18647v2 [cs.CR] for this version)

https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2603.18647 Focus to learn more arXiv-issued DOI via DataCite

arXivLabs is a framework that allows collaborators to develop and share new arXiv features directly on our website.

Both individuals and organizations that work with arXivLabs have embraced and accepted our values of openness, community, excellence, and user data privacy. arXiv is committed to these values and only works with partners that adhere to them.

Have an idea for a project that will add value for arXiv's community? Learn more about arXivLabs.

Text integral sub licența deschisă a publicației · 298 cuvinte

Subiecte conexe