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This research introduces CIPR, a novel benchmark demonstrating how user-side prompt configurations dynamically alter coding agents' susceptibility to repository poisoning attacks. The study reveals that task type significantly influences attack success rates, with test-execution tasks creating a particularly dangerous "silent" vulnerability surface where alerts are suppressed. These findings underscore the critical need for developers to understand how their specific invocation choices directly shape the security posture of AI-driven software engineering workflows.
Beyond the Payload: How User Invocation Shapes Coding Agent Vulnerability to Repository Poisoning
arXiv:2608.30686v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Coding agents are increasingly used for software engineering tasks, including bootstrapping projects from third-party repositories whose integrity cannot be assumed. Prior work on repository poisoning largely focuses on attacker-controlled injection and disguise, but developers also shape risk through everyday invocation choices: what task to delegate, how to phrase the request, and which skills or rules to supply. We term these user-side choices Prompt-Level Configurations (PLCs) and introduce CIPR (Coding In Poisoned Repos), the first benchmark that systematically varies PLCs in poisoned real-world repositories. CIPR comprises 1,920 instances across 20 repositories, four task types, three social-media-grounded prompt styles, and three skill/rule conditions, and measures attack success rate (ASR) and agent alert rate (AR) using automated runtime and trace-based oracles. Our evaluation reveals two key insights: (1) Vulnerability is highly context-dependent, with task type creating up to a 4.5-fold difference in ASR, with test-execution task forming a silent attack surface (high ASR, low AR). (2) Prompt expression shifts risk indirectly: underspecified prompts reduce ASR by truncating execution depth; noisy prompts exhibit a directional trend toward suppressing alerts by making malicious content less conspicuous. These findings highlight that coding agent vulnerability is not a static property, but a dynamic outcome shaped by everyday user configurations.
Abstract:Coding agents are increasingly used for software engineering tasks, including bootstrapping projects from third-party repositories whose integrity cannot be assumed. Prior work on repository poisoning largely focuses on attacker-controlled injection and disguise, but developers also shape risk through everyday invocation choices: what task to delegate, how to phrase the request, and which skills or rules to supply. We term these user-side choices Prompt-Level Configurations (PLCs) and introduce CIPR (Coding In Poisoned Repos), the first benchmark that systematically varies PLCs in poisoned real-world repositories. CIPR comprises 1,920 instances across 20 repositories, four task types, three social-media-grounded prompt styles, and three skill/rule conditions, and measures attack success rate (ASR) and agent alert rate (AR) using automated runtime and trace-based oracles. Our evaluation reveals two key insights: (1) Vulnerability is highly context-dependent, with task type creating up to a 4.5-fold difference in ASR, with test-execution task forming a silent attack surface (high ASR, low AR). (2) Prompt expression shifts risk indirectly: underspecified prompts reduce ASR by truncating execution depth; noisy prompts exhibit a directional trend toward suppressing alerts by making malicious content less conspicuous. These findings highlight that coding agent vulnerability is not a static property, but a dynamic outcome shaped by everyday user configurations.
Cryptography and Security (cs.CR); Computation and Language (cs.CL)
arXiv:2608.30686 [cs.CR]
(or arXiv:2608.30686v1 [cs.CR] for this version)
https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2608.30686 Focus to learn more arXiv-issued DOI via DataCite (pending registration)
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