Sari la conținut

Română · beta. Traducerea a fost făcută automat și este încă în curs de revizuire. Citește pagina în engleză

perspectiva aiqbenchSiguranță AI

analiza aiqbench

This paper advances AI safety and verification by introducing a framework that exposes architectural errors in model claims rather than just output hallucinations. Through extensive benchmark tuning and cryptographic enclave testing, it demonstrates methods for isolating interface failures and ensuring policy admissibility in enterprise-grade systems. The work provides critical insights into building self-auditing substrates capable of distinguishing between format admission issues and genuine task competence gaps.
Sursă care acoperăarXiv
Ce este aceastaLectura unui model asupra articolului și a acoperirii conexe, scrisă pentru aiqbench. Nu sunt cuvintele publicației.

BeTaL-GBI: Admission-Aware Benchmark Tuning and Full-Stack Verification of Geometric Belief Interfaces

arXiv3 min de cititArticolul și perspectiva sunt în engleză.

arXiv:2608.21503v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: A verification substrate is more credible when exposing errors in its own claims, not just model outputs. GBI-DCSE v3 falsified an architectural claim: the reported Fisher value epsilon ~ 0.066 satisfies the kappa^2 <= 10^4 budget only on the slice [epsilon, 3, 4, 5], while the full box [epsilon, 20]^4 requires epsilon ~ 0.326472. This erratum highlights whether an enterprise verification architecture can isolate interface failure, task competence, policy admissibility, and control integrity while keeping claims auditable. BoundaryBench v0.1 established the baseline: Qwen3-4B-Instruct-2507 completed 768 frozen executions, but 0% cleared the contract (369 failed parsing, 399 failed validation), limiting downstream selectivity metrics. This companion study evaluates three successive improvements. First, BeTaL-GBI v0.2 applies Benchmark Tuning with an LLM-in-the-loop over 2,218,750,380 grid points, separating format admission from conditional performance (rho_adm = N_admitted/N; rho_task = N_verified/N_admitted). Following schema repair, a model-free feedback search achieves a 2.87% mean held-out target gap, outperforming non-feedback baselines (13.61%, 11.46%). Second, GBI v2 swaps static keys for a reference-independent witness state W and policy P. Across 512 synthetic tasks, a 16-gate policy detects all 116 injected severe contradictions and accepts all 99 clean records (broad denominator: 4.27%). Hallucinator and evidence-forger surrogates are blocked with zero silent promotions. Third, GBI-DCSE v3 maps 99 claims to machine-readable evidence: 95 of 96 testable claims pass, with 148 standalone checks executed without failure. The harness exercises signed ledgers, PBFT quorums, and enclave forgery across 62 configurations. Under synthetic conditions, GBI-DCSE is a selective, policy-versioned, self-auditing test and routing substrate.

Abstract:A verification substrate is more credible when exposing errors in its own claims, not just model outputs. GBI-DCSE v3 falsified an architectural claim: the reported Fisher value epsilon ~ 0.066 satisfies the kappa^2 <= 10^4 budget only on the slice [epsilon, 3, 4, 5], while the full box [epsilon, 20]^4 requires epsilon ~ 0.326472. This erratum highlights whether an enterprise verification architecture can isolate interface failure, task competence, policy admissibility, and control integrity while keeping claims auditable. BoundaryBench v0.1 established the baseline: Qwen3-4B-Instruct-2507 completed 768 frozen executions, but 0% cleared the contract (369 failed parsing, 399 failed validation), limiting downstream selectivity metrics. This companion study evaluates three successive improvements. First, BeTaL-GBI v0.2 applies Benchmark Tuning with an LLM-in-the-loop over 2,218,750,380 grid points, separating format admission from conditional performance (rho_adm = N_admitted/N; rho_task = N_verified/N_admitted). Following schema repair, a model-free feedback search achieves a 2.87% mean held-out target gap, outperforming non-feedback baselines (13.61%, 11.46%). Second, GBI v2 swaps static keys for a reference-independent witness state W and policy P. Across 512 synthetic tasks, a 16-gate policy detects all 116 injected severe contradictions and accepts all 99 clean records (broad denominator: 4.27%). Hallucinator and evidence-forger surrogates are blocked with zero silent promotions. Third, GBI-DCSE v3 maps 99 claims to machine-readable evidence: 95 of 96 testable claims pass, with 148 standalone checks executed without failure. The harness exercises signed ledgers, PBFT quorums, and enclave forgery across 62 configurations. Under synthetic conditions, GBI-DCSE is a selective, policy-versioned, self-auditing test and routing substrate.

30 pages, Geometric Belief Interface, Decentralized Cryptographic Sheaf-Enclave, GBI, DCSE, GBI-DCSE, BoundaryBench v0.1, BeTaL-GBI v0.2, GBI v2, GBI-DCSE v3

Software Engineering (cs.SE); Cryptography and Security (cs.CR); Machine Learning (cs.LG)

arXiv:2608.21503 [cs.SE]

(or arXiv:2608.21503v1 [cs.SE] for this version)

Text integral sub licența deschisă a publicației · 285 cuvinte

Subiecte conexe