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This research moves beyond treating behavioral convergence as proof of social norms in multi-agent LLM systems, instead introducing a framework that measures agents' internal expectations to distinguish between social learning and selection mechanisms. The study demonstrates across four LLM families that eliciting these expectations enhances cooperation and reveals how different underlying processes sustain stability against adversarial disruption. For designers of autonomous agent societies, this offers a principled method to attribute specific social dynamics rather than relying on superficial behavioral outputs.
Behavior is Not Enough: A Mechanism-Based Evaluation of Social Norm Emergence in LLM Societies
arXiv:2609.26481v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Social norms cannot be identified from behavior alone: the same cooperative equilibrium may reflect shared expectations, strategic incentives, or simple imitation. Yet in multi-agent large language model systems, prior work largely treats behavioral convergence as evidence of norm emergence. In this work, we introduce an evaluation framework that measures agents' reported empirical and normative expectations in addition to behavioral convergence. Through controlled ablations, we test the effect of expectation elicitation and isolate two collective mechanisms central to theories of norm formation---social learning through interaction and social selection through network-based group formation. We further test the stability of these resulting dynamics under adversarial disruption across four LLM families. We find that eliciting expectations increases cooperative contributions, while social learning stabilizes behavior, and social selection reliably identifies cooperators but provides limited behavioral reinforcement. Following disruption, normative expectations and behavioral coordination recover differently. Together, these results show that similar cooperative outcomes can arise from different underlying social processes. By making expectations observable, our framework allows us to attribute each mechanism's contribution separately, offering designers of multi-agent systems a principled basis for selecting the social processes that sustain cooperation.
Abstract:Social norms cannot be identified from behavior alone: the same cooperative equilibrium may reflect shared expectations, strategic incentives, or simple imitation. Yet in multi-agent large language model systems, prior work largely treats behavioral convergence as evidence of norm emergence. In this work, we introduce an evaluation framework that measures agents' reported empirical and normative expectations in addition to behavioral convergence. Through controlled ablations, we test the effect of expectation elicitation and isolate two collective mechanisms central to theories of norm formation---social learning through interaction and social selection through network-based group formation. We further test the stability of these resulting dynamics under adversarial disruption across four LLM families. We find that eliciting expectations increases cooperative contributions, while social learning stabilizes behavior, and social selection reliably identifies cooperators but provides limited behavioral reinforcement. Following disruption, normative expectations and behavioral coordination recover differently. Together, these results show that similar cooperative outcomes can arise from different underlying social processes. By making expectations observable, our framework allows us to attribute each mechanism's contribution separately, offering designers of multi-agent systems a principled basis for selecting the social processes that sustain cooperation.
Multiagent Systems (cs.MA); Computation and Language (cs.CL); Computers and Society (cs.CY); Computer Science and Game Theory (cs.GT); Social and Information Networks (cs.SI)
arXiv:2609.26481 [cs.MA]
(or arXiv:2609.26481v1 [cs.MA] for this version)
https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2609.26481 arXiv-issued DOI via DataCite (pending registration)
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