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ASEval introduces a critical framework for securing autonomous agents by shifting security testing from simple prompt-response checks to comprehensive trajectory-level analysis of actions and tool usage. By generating perturbed multi-turn conversations, the method effectively uncovers pervasive risks in LLM-backed systems that traditional evaluation metrics miss. This work is essential as AI agents gain deeper system privileges, highlighting the urgent need for action-grounded oracles to validate complex agent behaviors before deployment.
ASEval: Automated Trajectory-Level Security Testing for Autonomous Agents
arXiv:2605.22321v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: As autonomous agents (e.g., OpenClaw) increasingly operate with deep system-level privileges to execute complex tasks, they introduce severe, unmitigated security risks. Existing LLM safety testing methods are largely built around prompt-level inputs and response-level judgments, while recent agent benchmarks remain limited in automation, trajectory coverage, and action-grounded judgment. In this work, we present ASEval, a novel automated security testing framework for autonomous agents. ASEval generates realistic benign multi-turn conversations, perturbs them into risk test cases through carefully designed perturbation operators, executes each case against the target agent, and applies an action-grounded oracle to judge the complete trace. We instantiate ASEval to construct A3S-Bench, a test suite of 2,254 executable multi-turn test cases spanning diverse usage scenarios, delivery patterns, and agent-level security risks. Extensive evaluation on 11 LLM-backed OpenClaw agents confirms that ASEval effectively exposes pervasive security failures. In particular, our proposed perturbation operators raise the average risk-trigger rate from 22.9% under existing injection techniques to 47.4%, as judged by an action-grounded oracle that matches human annotation at 93.2% binary F1. Our further analysis and case studies illustrate that such failures emerge from multi-turn delivery, persistent state, and tool-mediated actions that response-level evaluation overlooks.
Abstract:As autonomous agents (e.g., OpenClaw) increasingly operate with deep system-level privileges to execute complex tasks, they introduce severe, unmitigated security risks. Existing LLM safety testing methods are largely built around prompt-level inputs and response-level judgments, while recent agent benchmarks remain limited in automation, trajectory coverage, and action-grounded judgment. In this work, we present ASEval, a novel automated security testing framework for autonomous agents. ASEval generates realistic benign multi-turn conversations, perturbs them into risk test cases through carefully designed perturbation operators, executes each case against the target agent, and applies an action-grounded oracle to judge the complete trace. We instantiate ASEval to construct A3S-Bench, a test suite of 2,254 executable multi-turn test cases spanning diverse usage scenarios, delivery patterns, and agent-level security risks. Extensive evaluation on 11 LLM-backed OpenClaw agents confirms that ASEval effectively exposes pervasive security failures. In particular, our proposed perturbation operators raise the average risk-trigger rate from 22.9% under existing injection techniques to 47.4%, as judged by an action-grounded oracle that matches human annotation at 93.2% binary F1. Our further analysis and case studies illustrate that such failures emerge from multi-turn delivery, persistent state, and tool-mediated actions that response-level evaluation overlooks.
18 pages, 12 figures, 8 tables. Code and data available at this https URL
Cryptography and Security (cs.CR); Artificial Intelligence (cs.AI); Software Engineering (cs.SE)
arXiv:2605.22321 [cs.CR]
(or arXiv:2605.22321v2 [cs.CR] for this version)
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