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The paper argues that "internal signal" detectors for prompt injection measure different things (injection presence, recognition, routing, or behavioral influence), so AUROC scores alone don't show what a method detects. Its most useful finding for practitioners is that methods tied to attention diversion, exposure, or role confusion separate *successful* injections better, and that results can shift with the prompt template. Readers evaluating LLM defenses should check which property a detector actually captures before treating benchmark numbers as evidence of security.
Are You Reading the Right Thing? Rethinking Internal Signals for Prompt-Injection Detection
arXiv:2610.19452v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Several recent studies propose detecting prompt injections from a language model's internal state. However, these methods do not measure a single security property. Residual-stream probes, attention scores, role projections, exposure probes, and concept readouts may capture injection presence, recognition, information routing, or behavioral influence. It is therefore unclear what differences in prompt-injection detection performance reveal about the internal signals these methods read. We study how five representation-reading methods vary under a common structured indirect prompt-injection setup on Qwen3.6-35B-A3B and Gemma-4-26B-A4B-it. We evaluate each method by how well it distinguishes injected prompts from benign controls. We then further analyze each detection method's ability to detect attacks in cases where they are successful and in cases where they are not. This helps us better assess what properties each detection method might rely on. Methods trained to detect injection presence or attack-related concepts generally separate unsuccessful injections more strongly from benign inputs, whereas attention diversion, exposure, and role-confusion-based methods separate successful injections more strongly on both models. Attention Tracker provides the strongest consistent successful injection separation, reaching 0.949 AUROC on Qwen and 0.887 on Gemma. These results suggest that signals closer to response formation may better encode information about an attack's success, and that detection performance can depend strongly on the prompt template. We share the data associated with this study at https://anonymous.4open.science/r/paper-evaluation-data-7877
Title:Are You Reading the Right Thing? Rethinking Internal Signals for Prompt-Injection Detection
Abstract:Several recent studies propose detecting prompt injections from a language model's internal state. However, these methods do not measure a single security property. Residual-stream probes, attention scores, role projections, exposure probes, and concept readouts may capture injection presence, recognition, information routing, or behavioral influence. It is therefore unclear what differences in prompt-injection detection performance reveal about the internal signals these methods read. We study how five representation-reading methods vary under a common structured indirect prompt-injection setup on Qwen3.6-35B-A3B and Gemma-4-26B-A4B-it. We evaluate each method by how well it distinguishes injected prompts from benign controls. We then further analyze each detection method's ability to detect attacks in cases where they are successful and in cases where they are not. This helps us better assess what properties each detection method might rely on. Methods trained to detect injection presence or attack-related concepts generally separate unsuccessful injections more strongly from benign inputs, whereas attention diversion, exposure, and role-confusion-based methods separate successful injections more strongly on both models. Attention Tracker provides the strongest consistent successful injection separation, reaching 0.949 AUROC on Qwen and 0.887 on Gemma. These results suggest that signals closer to response formation may better encode information about an attack's success, and that detection performance can depend strongly on the prompt template. We share the data associated with this study at this https URL
Artificial Intelligence (cs.AI)
arXiv:2610.19452 [cs.AI]
(or arXiv:2610.19452v1 [cs.AI] for this version)
https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2610.19452 Focus to learn more arXiv-issued DOI via DataCite (pending registration)
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