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This study reveals that tool-using LLM agents frequently leak sensitive information during benign, non-adversarial operations by failing in areas like audience awareness and policy compliance. The findings underscore a critical safety gap where task capability does not guarantee secure data handling, establishing operational leakage as a primary concern distinct from traditional prompt injection attacks. For enterprise deployments relying on AI automation for email or database access, this research provides an essential framework for evaluating agent behavior beyond simple success metrics.
An Evaluation of Data Leakage Risks in Tool-Using LLM Agents in Realistic Scenarios
arXiv:2606.17114v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: AI agents are increasingly being adopted in enterprise and personal settings with access to emails, databases, documents, and other tools where they can read, update, and disseminate sensitive information. Much of prior research on data leakage risks in agents has focused on adversarial data exfiltration through prompt injections and jailbreaks. However, sensitive information may also be exposed during non-adversarial use, creating leakage risks even when users issue benign requests. We report a joint evaluation by the Singapore AI Safety Institute and the Korea AI Safety Institute examining agent data leakage in 12 realistic, non-adversarial tasks spanning customer support, DevOps, web automation, and enterprise and personal productivity. The evaluation covers five risk types: lack of data awareness, audience awareness, policy compliance, data minimization, and access-boundary awareness. Both institutes tested a common set of scenarios mirroring real-world deployments using independent testing environments and task-specific LLM-judge rubrics. Across the three tested agents, none achieved fully correct and fully safe execution across all scenarios. Successful task completion often coincided with data-handling failures such as accessing unnecessary information or disclosing information to inappropriate recipients, indicating that capability and data-handling safety should be evaluated separately. Qualitative review also revealed claim-action mismatches, simulation-aware behavior, user-simulator role reversal, and interpretation gaps in automated judging. Overall, the results indicate that operational data leakage is a first-order agent-safety concern distinct from adversarial exfiltration and provide a methodology for future evaluations of agent data-handling safety.
Abstract:AI agents are increasingly being adopted in enterprise and personal settings with access to emails, databases, documents, and other tools where they can read, update, and disseminate sensitive information. Much of prior research on data leakage risks in agents has focused on adversarial data exfiltration through prompt injections and jailbreaks. However, sensitive information may also be exposed during non-adversarial use, creating leakage risks even when users issue benign requests. We report a joint evaluation by the Singapore AI Safety Institute and the Korea AI Safety Institute examining agent data leakage in 12 realistic, non-adversarial tasks spanning customer support, DevOps, web automation, and enterprise and personal productivity. The evaluation covers five risk types: lack of data awareness, audience awareness, policy compliance, data minimization, and access-boundary awareness. Both institutes tested a common set of scenarios mirroring real-world deployments using independent testing environments and task-specific LLM-judge rubrics. Across the three tested agents, none achieved fully correct and fully safe execution across all scenarios. Successful task completion often coincided with data-handling failures such as accessing unnecessary information or disclosing information to inappropriate recipients, indicating that capability and data-handling safety should be evaluated separately. Qualitative review also revealed claim-action mismatches, simulation-aware behavior, user-simulator role reversal, and interpretation gaps in automated judging. Overall, the results indicate that operational data leakage is a first-order agent-safety concern distinct from adversarial exfiltration and provide a methodology for future evaluations of agent data-handling safety.
Cryptography and Security (cs.CR); Artificial Intelligence (cs.AI)
arXiv:2606.17114 [cs.CR]
(or arXiv:2606.17114v1 [cs.CR] for this version)
https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2606.17114 Focus to learn more arXiv-issued DOI via DataCite
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