analiza aiqbench
This research reframes AI alignment as a social choice problem, proposing a mathematical framework where welfare economics and mechanism design can optimize system behavior across diverse human preferences. By converting alignment protocols into linear optimization over an impact space, the study offers concrete alternatives to standard reinforcement learning from human feedback that better handle multi-person decision scenarios. The approach is validated empirically using real-world preference data ranging from kidney allocation to LLM responses, providing a rigorous path toward more equitable AI governance.
Algorithmic Impact Reveals the Hidden Social Choice Structure of Alignment
arXiv:2608.24046v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: When an AI algorithm makes decisions that affect more than one person, aligning it becomes a problem of social choice: how should people's divergent preferences about system behavior be reconciled and aggregated into a single coherent model? The standard approach to aligning frontier AI models$\unicode{x2013}$reinforcement learning from human feedback$\unicode{x2013}$largely sidesteps this question and has poor social choice guarantees. However, it remains unclear what alternative should replace it. We show that, by focusing directly on an algorithm's welfare consequences, the alignment problem can be reformulated as linear optimization over a convex impact space, which makes it amenable to the standard toolkit of welfare economics and mechanism design. This reformulation clarifies how alignment protocols translate into welfare consequences and, conversely, how a social planner's desired constraints on welfare consequences can be translated back into alignment protocols. We apply this transformation to show that voting-by-issues and random-dictatorship mechanisms are strategyproof and unanimous. Demonstrating the reverse direction, we also apply the impact representation to derive a family of alignment protocols that maximize utilitarian social welfare subject to various social desiderata, such as bounds on individual or group harm. We illustrate the welfare implications of these alignment protocols empirically using real human preferences over kidney allocation, charitable food distribution, LLM responses, and trolley problems.
Abstract:When an AI algorithm makes decisions that affect more than one person, aligning it becomes a problem of social choice: how should people's divergent preferences about system behavior be reconciled and aggregated into a single coherent model? The standard approach to aligning frontier AI models$\unicode{x2013}$reinforcement learning from human feedback$\unicode{x2013}$largely sidesteps this question and has poor social choice guarantees. However, it remains unclear what alternative should replace it. We show that, by focusing directly on an algorithm's welfare consequences, the alignment problem can be reformulated as linear optimization over a convex impact space, which makes it amenable to the standard toolkit of welfare economics and mechanism design. This reformulation clarifies how alignment protocols translate into welfare consequences and, conversely, how a social planner's desired constraints on welfare consequences can be translated back into alignment protocols. We apply this transformation to show that voting-by-issues and random-dictatorship mechanisms are strategyproof and unanimous. Demonstrating the reverse direction, we also apply the impact representation to derive a family of alignment protocols that maximize utilitarian social welfare subject to various social desiderata, such as bounds on individual or group harm. We illustrate the welfare implications of these alignment protocols empirically using real human preferences over kidney allocation, charitable food distribution, LLM responses, and trolley problems.
Artificial Intelligence (cs.AI)
arXiv:2608.24046 [cs.AI]
(or arXiv:2608.24046v1 [cs.AI] for this version)
https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2608.24046 Focus to learn more arXiv-issued DOI via DataCite (pending registration)
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