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This research establishes a unified framework for credit assignment in multi-agent systems by formalizing agent attribution as a cooperative game. The study demonstrates that simple Leave-One-Out interventions are computationally efficient and effective at isolating bottlenecks, outperforming introspective LLM judges while enabling targeted prompt optimization to improve system performance and ethical alignment.
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Agents that Matter: How Subtle Choices Shape Agent Attribution in Multi-Agent Systems

arXiv2 min de cititArticolul și perspectiva sunt în engleză.

arXiv:2605.27621v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: As multi-agent systems (MAS) become increasingly complex, identifying the contributions of agents is critical for system optimization. However, existing approaches lack a unified formulation for credit assignment. In this work, we formalize agent attribution as a cooperative game, parameterized by the coalition distribution, intervention protocol, and target metric. Using this framework, we demonstrate that intervention protocols induce distinct games: Agent ablation isolates structural bottlenecks, whereas introspective LLM judges fail to faithfully approximate this behavior. We further find that Leave-One-Out (LOO) identifies bottleneck agents as effectively as combinatorial methods at much lower computational cost. Treating prompt optimization as an intervention protocol, we show that prompt-conditioned attribution can identify optimization targets and improve MAS performance. Finally, we apply our framework to audit a medical MAS, revealing that agent contributions to diagnostic accuracy and ethical behavior are often decoupled. By intervening on counterproductive roles, we observe an increase in ethics alignment while maintaining diagnostic accuracy. Overall, this work provides a principled approach for cost-effective MAS attribution and intervention.

Abstract:As multi-agent systems (MAS) become increasingly complex, identifying the contributions of agents is critical for system optimization. However, existing approaches lack a unified formulation for credit assignment. In this work, we formalize agent attribution as a cooperative game, parameterized by the coalition distribution, intervention protocol, and target metric. Using this framework, we demonstrate that intervention protocols induce distinct games: Agent ablation isolates structural bottlenecks, whereas introspective LLM judges fail to faithfully approximate this behavior. We further find that Leave-One-Out (LOO) identifies bottleneck agents as effectively as combinatorial methods at much lower computational cost. Treating prompt optimization as an intervention protocol, we show that prompt-conditioned attribution can identify optimization targets and improve MAS performance. Finally, we apply our framework to audit a medical MAS, revealing that agent contributions to diagnostic accuracy and ethical behavior are often decoupled. By intervening on counterproductive roles, we observe an increase in ethics alignment while maintaining diagnostic accuracy. Overall, this work provides a principled approach for cost-effective MAS attribution and intervention.

Multiagent Systems (cs.MA); Computation and Language (cs.CL)

arXiv:2605.27621 [cs.MA]

(or arXiv:2605.27621v2 [cs.MA] for this version)

https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2605.27621 Focus to learn more arXiv-issued DOI via DataCite

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