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This research exposes a critical vulnerability in multi-agent clinical systems where socially plausible shortcuts, such as peer consensus on incorrect answers, can rapidly spread and compromise decision support. The study demonstrates that standard oversight mechanisms often fail to distinguish between genuine agreement and coordinated gaming of benchmarks, highlighting the need for independent referees capable of detecting these silent drifts without relying on self-reporting.
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Agents Catching Agents: Shortcut Cascades and Benchmark Gaming in Clinical Multi-Agent Systems

arXiv2 min de cititArticolul și perspectiva sunt în engleză.

arXiv:2608.03744v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Clinical decision support is moving toward committees of language-model agents deliberating on a shared workspace. We ask whether such committees can be gamed by shortcuts, cues a benchmark rewards but a clinician would ignore. Across seven cohorts on six public datasets spanning text (MedQA-USMLE, MedMCQA, MIMIC-CXR reports), imaging (NIH ChestX-ray14, MIMIC-CXR-JPG, CheXpert) and tabular ICU records (SUPPORT2), Gemini committees resist these cues in isolation (flip 5-16%), yet a socially plausible shortcut spreads: when two peers assert the same wrong answer, the holdout under test adopts it in 38% of cases, as does a false "pre-screen" system flag, on both capability tiers. Of three oversight agents, a gate cannot separate adoption from honest agreement (false-positive rate 100%); a same-lineage judge reading only the transcript flags adoption on text (precision 100%, recall 93%) but collapses onto the gate in imaging; a referee that privately re-queries the holdout transfers to imaging (77-88% precision, 13-21% false-positive rate). Tripling a cue's visual salience does not move contagion, whereas a second peer voice raises it by half again. Gaming a hidden rubric is near-silent: only 1/10 text and 1/134 imaging drifters name the rubric they moved toward. What games a committee is social plausibility, and only a referee independent of self-report catches it. Code: https://github.com/criticaldata/benchmaxxing

Authors:Sebastián Andrés Cajas Ordóñez, Agastya Munnangi, Aldo Marzullo, Felipe Ocampo Osorio, Quang Bui, Mohammad Shahin, Armaan Grewal, Emmanuel Paul Kwesiga, Anqi Peter Li, Josephine Nanyonjo, Aaditya Panchal, Arshnoor Bhutani, Nikhil Jaiswal, Milit S. Patel, Maximin Lange, Leo Anthony Celi

Abstract:Clinical decision support is moving toward committees of language-model agents deliberating on a shared workspace. We ask whether such committees can be gamed by shortcuts, cues a benchmark rewards but a clinician would ignore. Across seven cohorts on six public datasets spanning text (MedQA-USMLE, MedMCQA, MIMIC-CXR reports), imaging (NIH ChestX-ray14, MIMIC-CXR-JPG, CheXpert) and tabular ICU records (SUPPORT2), Gemini committees resist these cues in isolation (flip 5-16%), yet a socially plausible shortcut spreads: when two peers assert the same wrong answer, the holdout under test adopts it in 38% of cases, as does a false "pre-screen" system flag, on both capability tiers. Of three oversight agents, a gate cannot separate adoption from honest agreement (false-positive rate 100%); a same-lineage judge reading only the transcript flags adoption on text (precision 100%, recall 93%) but collapses onto the gate in imaging; a referee that privately re-queries the holdout transfers to imaging (77-88% precision, 13-21% false-positive rate). Tripling a cue's visual salience does not move contagion, whereas a second peer voice raises it by half again. Gaming a hidden rubric is near-silent: only 1/10 text and 1/134 imaging drifters name the rubric they moved toward. What games a committee is social plausibility, and only a referee independent of self-report catches it. Code: this https URL

Artificial Intelligence (cs.AI)

arXiv:2608.03744 [cs.AI]

(or arXiv:2608.03744v1 [cs.AI] for this version)

https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2608.03744 arXiv-issued DOI via DataCite (pending registration)

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