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This research addresses a critical blind spot in autonomous AI systems: fraud that occurs not through identity theft, but via legitimate transactions with overcharged counterparties. By introducing the Agentic Commerce Bench and the open-source Gordonguard stack, the authors provide essential tools to audit agent configurations and quantify the inherent loss limits of fully automated spending. The study underscores that traditional security checks keyed on identity are insufficient for agents that settle payments without human confirmation.
Agentic Commerce Bench: Measuring Fraud Detection for Agents That Spend Money
arXiv:2609.35886v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: AI agents now hold spend authority and settle payments without per-action human confirmation. The resulting loss is often not a security failure: a counterparty with the correct domain, the correct settlement address and a genuinely delivered service can charge more than it should, and no check keyed on identity will see it. We present three artefacts for measuring and reducing that loss. First, a taxonomy of agentic commerce fraud that separates five observation levels (agent reasoning, wire, settlement rail, counterparty, principal) from the request-level and history-level evidence available at each, and records which levels can observe which attacks. Second, Agentic Commerce Bench (ACB), a benchmark of twenty fraud classes generated from production aggregates, 1,647 catalogued service operations and 1,068 settlements, of which six involve a counterparty that is exactly who it claims to be. Third, gordonguard, an open-source detector stack and offline harness with which an operator can audit an agent configuration, replay hostile counterparties without an account, and run the same detectors inline. Calibrating to a stated false-positive budget on clean training traffic gives a 6.5% clean flag rate, replicated across three independent generations, and leaves eight of twenty classes no better than chance. On the four classes a reasoning layer can observe, a widely used agent security scanner run over its jailbreak-detection panel scores zero on all four, while correctly scoring 1.0 on a jailbreak supplied as a control. A measured median payment of $0.007 places a hard constraint on deployment: one human review costs 143 times the value of the payment it examines.
Abstract:AI agents now hold spend authority and settle payments without per-action human confirmation. The resulting loss is often not a security failure: a counterparty with the correct domain, the correct settlement address and a genuinely delivered service can charge more than it should, and no check keyed on identity will see it. We present three artefacts for measuring and reducing that loss. First, a taxonomy of agentic commerce fraud that separates five observation levels (agent reasoning, wire, settlement rail, counterparty, principal) from the request-level and history-level evidence available at each, and records which levels can observe which attacks. Second, Agentic Commerce Bench (ACB), a benchmark of twenty fraud classes generated from production aggregates, 1,647 catalogued service operations and 1,068 settlements, of which six involve a counterparty that is exactly who it claims to be. Third, gordonguard, an open-source detector stack and offline harness with which an operator can audit an agent configuration, replay hostile counterparties without an account, and run the same detectors inline. Calibrating to a stated false-positive budget on clean training traffic gives a 6.5% clean flag rate, replicated across three independent generations, and leaves eight of twenty classes no better than chance. On the four classes a reasoning layer can observe, a widely used agent security scanner run over its jailbreak-detection panel scores zero on all four, while correctly scoring 1.0 on a jailbreak supplied as a control. A measured median payment of $0.007 places a hard constraint on deployment: one human review costs 143 times the value of the payment it examines.
12 pages, 4 figures. Code and data: this https URL
Cryptography and Security (cs.CR); Artificial Intelligence (cs.AI); Computers and Society (cs.CY)
arXiv:2609.35886 [cs.CR]
(or arXiv:2609.35886v1 [cs.CR] for this version)
https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2609.35886 Focus to learn more arXiv-issued DOI via DataCite (pending registration)
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