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This research introduces Agent-Canary-Mas, a rigorous evaluation framework for detecting protocol risks in long-horizon multi-agent systems where local exploits often fail to propagate but still pose significant downstream threats. By distinguishing between local attack success and consequential task outcomes, the study demonstrates that cross-agent evidence dramatically improves audit accuracy compared to isolated assessments. The findings highlight critical vulnerabilities in agent-to-agent coordination mechanisms and validate the necessity of authority checks at handoff points to mitigate financial and operational risks.
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Agent-Canary-Mas: End-to-End Evaluation of Protocol Risk in Long-Horizon Multi-Agent Systems

arXiv3 min de cititArticolul și perspectiva sunt în engleză.

arXiv:2610.15529v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Agent-to-agent protocols allow LLM agents to discover peers, exchange results, and coordinate tool use. A locally successful protocol attack, however, may be rejected by a later agent or propagated into a consequential task decision. Measuring local exploitability alone leaves this difference unresolved and provides limited evidence about which participant caused the final outcome. We present Agent-Canary-Mas, an end-to-end evaluation system that follows protocol risk through long-horizon multi-agent tasks. It covers five risk classes and 13 subclasses across A2A, ANP, and BCS, with 975 matched malicious--benign task pairs in five business domains. A shared OpenClaw framework runs autonomous, tool-using agents under different underlying models while preserving the task and execution setup. Matched runs separate local protocol success from downstream consequences; retained evidence connects participant selection, message consumption, tool activity, and task-state changes. We further evaluate a protocol-context Guard that checks an object's authority at consequential handoffs. Across three model conditions, local attack success is frequently at or above 90%, while consequence conversion ranges from 7.1\% to 100.0\%. Cross-agent evidence raises macro-averaged Audit-F1 from 29.7% to 95.5%. On Finance tasks, the Guard lowers average ASR from 86.1% to 53.8% and PTCR from 65.5% to 31.2%, with a measurable completion tradeoff. These results show that protocol risk depends on how agents use exchanged objects throughout the task, and that evaluating this path supports more informative risk assessment, attribution, and defense.

Abstract:Agent-to-agent protocols allow LLM agents to discover peers, exchange results, and coordinate tool use. A locally successful protocol attack, however, may be rejected by a later agent or propagated into a consequential task decision. Measuring local exploitability alone leaves this difference unresolved and provides limited evidence about which participant caused the final outcome. We present Agent-Canary-Mas, an end-to-end evaluation system that follows protocol risk through long-horizon multi-agent tasks. It covers five risk classes and 13 subclasses across A2A, ANP, and BCS, with 975 matched malicious--benign task pairs in five business domains. A shared OpenClaw framework runs autonomous, tool-using agents under different underlying models while preserving the task and execution setup. Matched runs separate local protocol success from downstream consequences; retained evidence connects participant selection, message consumption, tool activity, and task-state changes. We further evaluate a protocol-context Guard that checks an object's authority at consequential handoffs. Across three model conditions, local attack success is frequently at or above 90%, while consequence conversion ranges from 7.1% to 100.0%. Cross-agent evidence raises macro-averaged Audit-F1 from 29.7% to 95.5%. On Finance tasks, the Guard lowers average ASR from 86.1% to 53.8% and PTCR from 65.5% to 31.2%, with a measurable completion tradeoff. These results show that protocol risk depends on how agents use exchanged objects throughout the task, and that evaluating this path supports more informative risk assessment, attribution, and defense.

Artificial Intelligence (cs.AI)

arXiv:2610.15529 [cs.AI]

(or arXiv:2610.15529v2 [cs.AI] for this version)

https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2610.15529 Focus to learn more arXiv-issued DOI via DataCite

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