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This study reveals critical adversarial vulnerabilities in learning-based telesurgery policies, demonstrating that subtle visual perturbations can drastically reduce surgical success rates. The findings underscore the urgent need for robustness testing against both disruptive and steering attacks before these AI-driven systems are deployed in clinical environments.
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Adversarial Vulnerabilities of Learned Telesurgery Policies

arXiv3 min de cititArticolul și perspectiva sunt în engleză.

arXiv:2606.11535v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: While not yet in clinical deployment, learning-based policies are increasingly considered to augment the dexterity of human surgeons in robot-assisted surgery. Can the end-to-end mapping from visual observations to robot actions be vulnerable to adversarial attacks? We present the first study of adversarial vulnerabilities in learning-based policies for surgical robotics, conducted in a laboratory white-box setting where the attacker is assumed to have access to policy information and injects perturbations into the video stream transmitted over the network. Two attack modes are considered: (a) disruptive attacks, where subtle visual perturbations interrupt policy execution without being noticed by a surgeon, and (b) steering attacks, where perturbations steer policy actions toward attacker-specified directions. We study three adversarial attack methods, each with increasing access to policy information, and evaluate their impact on two surgical subtasks: debridement and suturing, performed on phantoms. Our evaluation covers three end-to-end policy architectures: ACT, Diffusion Policy, and pi0. In addition, we identify a vulnerability to photometric perturbations, which mimic natural visual changes such as lighting variation. Results from 620 physical experiments suggest that state-of-the-art policies can be significantly disrupted, resulting in an average 61% reduction in surgical subtask success rates. These findings suggest that adversarial vulnerabilities are important to consider for learned telesurgery policies. Project page: https://surgical-robotics.github.io/adversarial-vulnerability/

Abstract:While not yet in clinical deployment, learning-based policies are increasingly considered to augment the dexterity of human surgeons in robot-assisted surgery. Can the end-to-end mapping from visual observations to robot actions be vulnerable to adversarial attacks? We present the first study of adversarial vulnerabilities in learning-based policies for surgical robotics, conducted in a laboratory white-box setting where the attacker is assumed to have access to policy information and injects perturbations into the video stream transmitted over the network. Two attack modes are considered: (a) disruptive attacks, where subtle visual perturbations interrupt policy execution without being noticed by a surgeon, and (b) steering attacks, where perturbations steer policy actions toward attacker-specified directions. We study three adversarial attack methods, each with increasing access to policy information, and evaluate their impact on two surgical subtasks: debridement and suturing, performed on phantoms. Our evaluation covers three end-to-end policy architectures: ACT, Diffusion Policy, and pi0. In addition, we identify a vulnerability to photometric perturbations, which mimic natural visual changes such as lighting variation. Results from 620 physical experiments suggest that state-of-the-art policies can be significantly disrupted, resulting in an average 61% reduction in surgical subtask success rates. These findings suggest that adversarial vulnerabilities are important to consider for learned telesurgery policies. Project page: this https URL

Robotics (cs.RO)

arXiv:2606.11535 [cs.RO]

(or arXiv:2606.11535v2 [cs.RO] for this version)

https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2606.11535 Focus to learn more arXiv-issued DOI via DataCite

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