analiza aiqbench
This research proposes a certified detection framework that guarantees adversarial inputs are flagged rather than certifying prediction invariance, addressing the high cost of false negatives in safety-critical systems. By reducing robustness verification to a single Lipschitz constant estimation, the method enables deployment on pre-trained models without retraining while maintaining strong formal guarantees across standard benchmarks.
Adversarial Detection for Pre-trained Classifiers via Lipschitz-Margin Analysis with Certification
arXiv:2610.15359v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Deep classifiers deployed in safety-critical services like autonomous-driving perception remain vulnerable to small adversarial perturbations. Certified $\ell_2$ defenses today face a costly trade-off: randomized smoothing (RS) requires hundreds of noisy queries per input, while Lipschitz networks (LN) constrain the architecture and sacrifice clean accuracy. We take a detection-oriented approach instead: rather than certifying that predictions are invariant inside an $\ell_2$ ball, we certify that adversarial inputs within an $\ell_2$ ball are \emph{detected} --- a guarantee aligned with security-critical deployments where missing an attack is costlier than flagging a clean input. To realize this, we prove a Lipschitz-margin reduction from certified $\ell_2$ robustness to certified detection, which reduces the problem to handling a single Lipschitz constant $L$. We introduce two detector families: $\mathbb{D}_{Adv}$, which estimates $L$ from a single defender-side perturbed pair, and $\mathbb{D}_{lc}$, which augments that pair with a local margin centroid to keep the estimate above what the certificate requires. Both deploy on any pretrained classifier without retraining. With a valid global bound, the detector is fully certified at that radius; with a local estimate $L'$, certification is sample-wise and applies only when our certified condition holds. Across MNIST, CIFAR-10, and ImageNet-1k on four backbones (LeNet-5, VGG16, ResNet-50, ViT-B/16), our detectors match or outperform five baselines (CTT, SortNet, CRM, ContraNet, A$^2$D). For CIFAR-10 with 1-Lipschitz SortNet, our reduction delivers $100\%$ certified detection at the lowest FPR among compared certified detectors; on the standard CIFAR-10 VGG16, our detectors reject all evaluated in-budget adversarial examples, with 62-82\% both rejected and formally certified.
Abstract:Deep classifiers deployed in safety-critical services like autonomous-driving perception remain vulnerable to small adversarial perturbations. Certified $\ell_2$ defenses today face a costly trade-off: randomized smoothing (RS) requires hundreds of noisy queries per input, while Lipschitz networks (LN) constrain the architecture and sacrifice clean accuracy. We take a detection-oriented approach instead: rather than certifying that predictions are invariant inside an $\ell_2$ ball, we certify that adversarial inputs within an $\ell_2$ ball are \emph{detected} --- a guarantee aligned with security-critical deployments where missing an attack is costlier than flagging a clean input. To realize this, we prove a Lipschitz-margin reduction from certified $\ell_2$ robustness to certified detection, which reduces the problem to handling a single Lipschitz constant $L$. We introduce two detector families: $\mathbb{D}_{Adv}$, which estimates $L$ from a single defender-side perturbed pair, and $\mathbb{D}_{lc}$, which augments that pair with a local margin centroid to keep the estimate above what the certificate requires. Both deploy on any pretrained classifier without retraining. With a valid global bound, the detector is fully certified at that radius; with a local estimate $L'$, certification is sample-wise and applies only when our certified condition holds. Across MNIST, CIFAR-10, and ImageNet-1k on four backbones (LeNet-5, VGG16, ResNet-50, ViT-B/16), our detectors match or outperform five baselines (CTT, SortNet, CRM, ContraNet, A$^2$D). For CIFAR-10 with 1-Lipschitz SortNet, our reduction delivers $100\%$ certified detection at the lowest FPR among compared certified detectors; on the standard CIFAR-10 VGG16, our detectors reject all evaluated in-budget adversarial examples, with 62-82\% both rejected and formally certified.
Machine Learning (cs.LG); Artificial Intelligence (cs.AI)
arXiv:2610.15359 [cs.LG]
(or arXiv:2610.15359v1 [cs.LG] for this version)
https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2610.15359 Focus to learn more arXiv-issued DOI via DataCite (pending registration)
arXivLabs is a framework that allows collaborators to develop and share new arXiv features directly on our website.
Both individuals and organizations that work with arXivLabs have embraced and accepted our values of openness, community, excellence, and user data privacy. arXiv is committed to these values and only works with partners that adhere to them.
Have an idea for a project that will add value for arXiv's community? Learn more about arXivLabs.
Text integral sub licența deschisă a publicației · 348 cuvinte
Subiecte conexe
[AINews] not much happened today
Latent Space · 3 oct. 2026
Frontier AI Risk Report (February–March 2026)
METR · 19 mai 2026
Informe de riesgos de la IA de frontera (febrero–marzo de 2026)
METR · 19 mai 2026
Frontier Risk Report (February to March 2026)
METR · 19 mai 2026